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Keir Starmer has been leader of the UK Labour Party for one month. Early in the leadership 
contest Rebecca Long-Bailey was touted, as the Corbynite candidate, the most likely to find 
favour with the membership to replace Jeremy Corbyn. However, new members who had 
not sympathised with Corbyn joined to vote for Starmer. Soft left and right members 
supported him. And some Corbynites turned to Starmer as the candidate seen most likely to 
win the next general election. Starmer’s messages during the leadership campaign stayed 
open enough to keep many from all wings of the party on board. 
 
Starmer campaigned on a platform that there was no point to Labour unless they could win 
power and that four times since 2010 they had excluded themselves from being in that 
position. Unity and an end to factionalism was, he said, key to electoral success. But Starmer 
also commended Corbyn’s shifting of Labour to an anti-austerity position and said it was not 
the right time to steer away from the broad policy positions of the previous leader.  
 
It’s early days and a lot could change but what this has led to so far, I want to argue, is 
technocratic ambiguity alongside factionalist anti-factionalism. What this means in terms of 
ideology and policy is unclear, deliberately so. Starmer needs to appeal across the breadth 
of the UK’s fractionalised diverse social structure, not to mention across his own party, but I 
think there are substantive and committed clear policy bases on which he can do so.  
 
The search for unity in Starmer’s Labour 
 
Starmer argued throughout the leadership campaign for unity and an end to factionalism. 
We can’t win if we keep ‘taking lumps out of each other’ has been a frequent and 
continuing refrain. During the leadership campaign the candidates mostly stuck to this, the 
benefit for Starmer that he was protected from criticism by the other contenders. But what 
does unity mean and where will it lead?  
 
Early clues came with Starmer’s appointments to the Labour frontbench. The soft left took 
over dominance of the shadow cabinet, anti-Corbyn right-wingers given junior front bench 
jobs. The number of Corbynites in the top teams were significantly reduced. This seems less 
an end to factionalism than one group being put in the driving seat and other others kept 
down.  
 
I want to outline what form ‘unity’ under Starmer could take and what it could mean if a 
substantive approach were taken to bridging across the party and electorate. There are 9 
ways you can look at Starmer’s approach to pursuing unity, three of them outlined by Oliver 
Eagleton.   
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Firstly, unity can be built on reconciling differences and building consensus and a common 
view on ideology and policy. But the Labour Party has always been a broad church, as its 
MPs have liked to repeat. Differences are of genuine and reasonable ideological kinds, not 
least between mitigating social democrats and reforming democratic socialists who want a 
different kind of society, and many other positions along that spectrum. Factionalism is built 
into Labour and politics in general is inherently conflictual. The differences in Labour can be 
healthy or pursued unhealthily. But there are essential ideological differences and 
consensus across them is not possible. 
 
A second approach is compromise. The factions of the party can reach a compromise over a 
programme that is far from perfect for any of them but which they can mostly agree on to 
win power, implement and make the world a better place. So, a negotiated agreement. 
Agreed compromises are less than consensus but more possible. The differences to be 
overcome to achieve this across the party still provide a mountain to climb and so far 
Starmer is not proposing anything of substance around which negotiated agreement can be 
built. But he has only been leader for a month and hopefully this is to come. I want to come 
back to this in the second half of this article.  
 
Thirdly, while factions of the party may not be able to forge a consensus or negotiate an 
agreement they can compromise on, they could call a truce or ceasefire to stop any fighting 
and win power. They may not all be able to agree to the programme but they can suppress 
dissent over it. This might be possible for a while but is unlikely to last. A truce can only hold 
so long under the pressure of real differences in ideology, policy and objectives. It will need 
to be built on something substantive in common, maybe coupling with one of the other 
options outlined. In fact, truce (option 3) plus negotiated agreement (option 2) is what 
Starmer has said he means by unity.  
 
Fourthly, Starmer may be able to mobilise a hegemonic position, where he sets out an 
ideological and policy programme of ruling ideas that can mobilise people behind it. So, 
while a programme may not be agreed by all, hegemonic leadership around a narrative that 
wins enough acquiescence to establish dominance for his leadership can save the day. Here 
one faction or factions may lead, and the others fall into place. Starmer does not yet have 
an evident clear ideology or perspective and the dominant group in the PLP, the soft left, 
may not either. They have tended to swing behind the dominant strand in the party and 
pursue moderately left policies that are electorally possible rather than having an approach 
driving them that could become hegemonic. The Corbynite left has more of a worked-out 
approach so Starmer could build from that basis to develop a hegemonic project.  
 
A fifth method is more pragmatic: live with the differences in the party but try to manage 
them. Each faction can be given enough in terms of jobs and policies to keep them happy 
and in place behind the overall project. However, while the soft left in Starmer’s Labour are 
getting the main jobs and the right more than before, the firm left are not being kept on 
board in this way and Starmer’s policies are not yet clear enough to be a tool for managing 
the factions.  
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A sixth and stronger approach is marginalisation. This is not one where rival groups are 
hegemonically kept behind the leader’s project, but where they are marginalised to the 
extent they have minor or peripheral roles, giving them a place but keeping them away from 
power. It involves marginalisation of some rather than overall unity, and this seems to be in 
part what is going on, so far at least.  
 
Seventhly, one way of achieving unity is through ambiguity. The leader is vague and 
promises things with enough lack of precision and concrete detail to avoid alienating 
people, but with enough and sufficiently abstractly to give all something and keep them on 
board. This seems to be what Starmer is doing so far. His 10 pledges, for instance, appear, 
on the surface, to keep to the Corbynite stance of the party, useful when appealing to 
members for their vote in the leadership contest. Where they are specific is on pledges that 
are less controversial for Labour members. Otherwise they are defined in an abstract 
enough way to be acceptable to many whilst being open to taking quite varying concrete 
forms in practice. Starmer’s pre-parliament past and his voting record as an MP make it 
difficult to pin down where his ideology and policy preferences are. This could be because 
he genuinely is open within the bounds of his soft left instincts.  
 
Eighthly, Starmer can manage the factions of the party by arguing decisions need to be 
made technocratically: keeping different people together by saying ideology and policy have 
to be guided by what is possible to win an election and power. Politics is inherently 
conflictual and so potentially disunifying. So, one way to achieve something that looks like 
unity is anti-political, suppressing disunity through technocracy, arguing for the necessary to 
try to push aside difference and contestation. Technocracy was what the anti-austerity left 
was replacing in parts of Europe, or trying to, albeit a technocracy for different reasons and 
in different circumstances. In the context of Starmer’s Labour it may be framed in terms of 
pursuing professionalism and competence.  
 
Ninthly, it seems possible that Starmer so far is carrying out a combination of some of these 
approaches: technocratic ambiguity, with marginalisation of the Corbynite left and 
participation of the right in lower down roles. Marginalisation of a faction is not unity or 
anti-factionalism but incomplete unity and suppression of a faction: factional anti-
factionalism. This is coupled with ambiguity on substance. Starmer’s Labour is not a return 
to either Corbynism or Blairism. A return to neoliberal social democracy is not sought by 
most in the Labour Party and a continuation of Corbynism not wanted by the soft left or 
right. These are not being replaced yet with anything new in substance; but with ambiguity 
about what is being pursued and a technocratic approach presented as competence, 
professionalism and electability: technocratic ambiguity.  
 
Beyond ambiguity and factionalism to the next election 
 
If electability is the focus the question is what will win votes to get Labour into power at the 
next election. One way is to stick to professionalism and competence, with manufactured 
unity and the suppression of factionalism, that will appeal to the electorate across the 
board. In such an approach the party avoids too much in the way of ideas or policies that 
offer hostages to fortune and may win over parts of Labour’s complex social base but at the 
expense of alienating others. Pundits have argued for competence as the top electoral 
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priority, advising against appealing on the basis of policy now. Corbyn’s leadership was 
allegedly not competent or professional and Starmer’s shadow cabinet choices and 
approach so far have been defined in terms of competence. 
 
If policy is to be developed, it is argued, the party should orient to where voters are rather 
than where Labour wants them to be. Starmer’s appointment of Claire Ainsley as his 
Director of Policy suggests he may be navigating down this road. She has argued that finding 
what working class voters feel and adapting policy to that is the way to go, rather than 
starting from the point of trying to persuade them of the policy approach you feel may 
actually benefit them.  
 
It is not crystal clear that lack of professionalism and competence were what put electors off 
Corbyn in the 2019 election; nor that lack of these as opposed to challenges to his 
leadership from his own MPs were what undermined Corbyn’s position in the party - in 
other words factionalism, political conflict, and lack of professionalism towards Corbyn, as 
the leaked party report exposed. What gets sneered at as incompetence in political 
leadership is often decisions made as the result of conflict and attempts to negotiate it, 
more the outcome of politics than lack of professionalism; the handling of anti-Semitism in 
Labour and the party’s position on Brexit arguably being examples. And in the era of Trump 
and Johnson it is not certain that what makes Prime Ministerial material for voters is 
professionalism and competence.  
 
It is in substance as much as style that Labour needs to win support for the next election. 
Not building support for policy, and ambiguity on some of it, were part of what sunk Labour 
in 2019. So, as Starmer himself said during the leadership campaign, Labour needs to start 
defining policy early and building the case for it over time. The electorate is very diverse in 
many ways, and Labour requires support widely across it meaning that promises made to 
some groups that are less appealing to others will not work. However real unity and wide 
appeal can be made on the basis of policy. This can be on Labour’s democratic economy and 
green new deal policies. These were central to Labour’s programme under Corbyn but kept 
quite quiet in the 2019 election campaign. 
 
Across MPs and the Labour Party, social ownership of one form or another has appeal 
despite Blair’s campaign to rid Labour of its commitment to public ownership. It is classic 
Labour territory and has become part of the mainstream again. And social ownership 
proposals under Corbyn were across a range of types, local and national, decentralised and 
centralised, from co-ops to state ownership, in a market rather than a planned economy, 
providing something for all wings of the party to agree with. Where public ownership of rail, 
mail, energy and water were proposed this was not simply in the form of old-style state 
ownership, even though that is back in vogue, but sometimes localised and with more 
democratically inclusive ownership. This is not just steered by whichever politicians are in 
power and run by managers, often from the private sector, but incorporating workers, 
managers, consumers and communities in democratic control and with clear social and 
ethical rather than just efficiency goals. Social ownership, furthermore, is not just an idea. In 
addition to its longstanding past it has recent successful concrete bases in initiatives like 
community wealth building in UK and USA municipalities in which local government 
procurement is used to ensure money is reinvested in poor areas, co-ops and social and 
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ethical aims rather than disappearing away to corporate shareholders and goals that benefit 
them.  
 
The green new deal also has resonance. The Labour Party is committed to tackling climate 
change and the green new deal proposes measures to do this through policies of industrial 
restructuring and investment in green industry to create jobs and demand that assist the 
unemployed, working class, poor, excluded and minorities. The democratic economy and 
green new deal can stimulate support from the right to the Corbynite left in the party, all of 
whom are behind their social and environmental ends and can find something in the diverse 
means for pursuing them, local and national, democratic and inclusive. They can bring 
substance to Starmer's emphasis on unity and anti-factionalism, through negotiated 
agreement, the second method for pursuing unity outlined above, which, while short of 
consensus, can be a basis also for the third approach of truce and ceasefire.  
 
The same bridging can be done with such policies across the public. Polls suggest the 
electorate are willing to vote for action on climate change  and support the green new deal 
including in areas Labour needs to hold or win. Social ownership policies have public 
support. From red wall towns to wider sections of society the electorate want to see 
investment, economic rejuvenation and measures to tackle insecurity, exclusion and 
poverty, something both policy approaches aim at and have concrete records on. Economic 
rejuvenation to tackle exclusion and unemployment coupled with green change and local 
inclusive democracy relate to the politics of both northern town working class voters and 
young educated metropolitan electors. This is a better way to go policy-wise than staying 
ambiguous on policy to avoid the risk of alienating someone or by appealing to the lowest 
common denominator. In Scotland this approach will have to be coupled with radical 
proposals for devolution to draw voters back from the SNP. And an economy of community 
investment fits with post Covid-19 rebuilding in an era where austerity has less of a ring to it 
than ten years ago. 
 
One of Starmer’s criticisms of the 2019 electoral strategy was that there were too many 
policies being propounded, introduced too late to be built for. Labour needs a focused 
narrative for the next election, if not as narrow as 'Get Brexit Done', built for over time. The 
democratic economy and green new deal are in place in detail and could be the axis around 
which this is done. The left is at an advanced state policy-wise and in a good place to build 
support for well-established policies. The solution is to make the politics work for the policy 
and use policy as the basis for the politics. It is not to side-line policy especially where it 
meets the criterion for a focused, substantive message with appeal across groups.  
 
Starmer seems at this stage to be pursuing technocratic ambiguity and factional anti-
factionalism in the name of unity and election victory. But these are early days. He can 
move on from ambiguity to ambitious substance and bring together factions by approaches 
that unusually have an appeal to different wings of the party and across the electorate from 
the young, middle class and educated, both public sector and private sector voters, to the 
more working class and excluded. The policy is there. It needs the politics.  
 
